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BOUNDARY DISPUTES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NEPAD IN WEST AFRICA: 2001-2014
- Background of the Study
The promotion of peace and development is the overarching goal of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an African-owned strategic framework for the continent’s renewal. Among NEPAD’s priorities, as preconditions for growth and development, are peace, security and good governance. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by African Leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of under-development and exclusion in a globalizing world. The programme is a new framework of interaction with the rest of the world including industrialized countries and multi-lateral organizations. It is based on the agenda set by African peoples through their own initiatives and of their own volition, to shape their own destiny.
According to USAID (1999), the end of the Cold War has had contradictory influences on the nature and incidence of disputes and conflicts across the globe; while warfare, particularly boundary disputes, subsided in Asia and Latin America; it surged in Africa as the continent witnessed numerous cross boundary disputes. Intrastate conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa has reversed years, even decades of development progress and brought about environmental devastation, tremendous population movements, and political destabilization of neighbors, public health emergencies, economic collapse, and extraordinary human suffering. Almost without exception, writers on the subject of violent conflict in Africa discuss the continent’s development dilemmas, which include lack of economic progress, environmental degradation, poor soils and climates, abysmal health and education indicators, massive levels of population movements (both voluntary and involuntary), exploding urban growth, disintegration of state services, and so forth.
Rock (1993) gives a gloomy historical account of Africa’s development performance as compared to the continents of Asia and Latin America. According to him, without question, Sub-Saharan Africa, with its crises in agriculture, environment, economics, and governance, poses by far the greatest development challenge the world now faces. Violent and boundary conflict is very much a part of this development dilemma. Traditionally, the development community lacked integrated perspectives on warfare, and characterized assistance in complex emergencies as “humanitarian” rather than developmental. USAID (1999) argued that it is now generally recognized that complex emergencies and sustainable development lie at opposite ends of a continuum and that both “development” and “relief” professionals must have a clear understanding of this connection.
NEPAD (2001) notes that the impoverishment of the African continent was accentuated primarily by the legacy of colonialism, the Cold War, the workings of the international economic system, and the inadequacies of and shortcomings in the policies pursued by many countries in the post-independence era. For centuries, Africa has been integrated into the world economy mainly as a supplier of cheap labour and raw materials. Of necessity, according to NEPAD (2001), this has meant the draining of Africa’s resources rather than their use for the continent’s development. The drive in that period to use the minerals and raw materials to develop manufacturing industries and a highly skilled labour force to sustain growth and development was lost. Thus, Africa remains the poorest continent despite being one of the most richly endowed regions of the world.
Maserumule (2011) opine that in other countries and on other continents, the reverse was the case. There was an infusion of wealth in the form of investments, which created larger volumes of wealth through the export of value-added products. However, Africa have not harnessed her resources to create wealth for the well-being of its peoples. Colonialism subverted hitherto traditional structures, institutions and values or made them subservient to the economic and political needs of the imperial powers. It also retarded the development of an entrepreneurial class, as well as a middle class with skills and managerial capacity.
According to NEPAD (2001), Africa’s place in the global community is defined by the fact that the continent is an indispensable resource base that has served all humanity for so many centuries. These resources can be broken down into the following components:
- The rich complex of mineral, oil and gas deposits, the flora and fauna, and the wide unspoiled natural habitat, which provide the basis for mining, agriculture, tourism and industrial development;
- The ecological lung provided by the continent’s rainforests, and the minimal presence of emissions and effluents that are harmful to the environment.
- a global public good that benefits all humankind;
- The paleontological and archaeological sites containing evidence of the origins of the earth, life and the human race, and the natural habitats containing a wide variety of flora and fauna, unique animal species and the open uninhabited spaces that are a feature of the continent;
- The richness of Africa’s culture and its contribution to the variety of the cultures of the global community.
Evbuomwan (2007) points that at independence, virtually all the new states were characterized by a shortage of skilled professionals and a weak capitalist class, resulting in a weakening of the accumulation process. Sambanis (2004) observed that post-colonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies, which were further aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad governance in many countries. These two factors, together with the divisions caused by the Cold War, hampered the development of accountable governments across the continent.
NEPAD (2001) observed that many African governments did not empower their peoples to embark on development initiatives to realize their creative potential. Today, the weak state remains a major constraint on sustainable development in a number of countries. Indeed, one of Africa’s major challenges is to strengthen the capacity to govern and to develop long-term policies. At the same time, there is also the urgent need to implement far reaching reforms and programmes in many African states and curtail the prospects of intra-boundary disputes. According to Raleigh et al (2009) contend that the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s provided only a partial solution to Africa’s development challenges. They promoted reforms that tended to remove serious price distortions, but gave inadequate attention to the provision of social services. The impact of structural adjustment and the harsh conditionalities it imposes is a topic that appears throughout the literature, with many authors concluding that it has contributed to political instability and violence. Martin and O’Meara (1995) note that austerity measures have required abrupt, drastic changes in monetary and fiscal policies that have led directly to political instability, and Conteh-Morgan (1994) noted how economic hardship and imposed austerity measures may undermine the legitimacy of a government. Rothchild’s (1995) examination of the state collapse in Ghana is yet another example. After the democratically elected Limann administration became mired in ineffectiveness, Rawlings seized power in a 1981 coup. Initially seeking to achieve legitimacy through populism, he abandoned this in favor of imposing an unpopular reform package. Although Ghana’s economic decline was halted, this did not translate into legitimacy for the Rawlings government; some sectors of the public were hard-hit, and the government’s reliance on external recommendations and funds heightened popular mistrust.
Ake (1996) argued that Africa’s development has not been a failure – he posits that development has simply never truly been on the agenda of African leaders or the international community in the first place. Asserting that political conditions have been the greatest impediments to development in Africa, he constructs a sophisticated explanation of how African politics have been constituted in such a way as to prevent development. He argues that arbitrary and absolute power were two major features of the colonial era which carry over to the present day. Ake explores how intense, zero-sum competition arose over the capture of state power and how its use as the sole avenue for material accumulation came to dominate politics. In this context, cleavages were reinforced as leaders manipulated communal loyalties, transforming ethnicity into a menacing political force. In efforts to consolidate power and cut off opponents, the state became an agent for the appropriation of wealth and a tool to punish adversaries’ pocketbooks. The character of politics thus led to a economic crisis and violent competition.
Ake further argues that political elites in essence passed on the responsibility of development to Cold War patrons, expecting development budgets to be financed externally. He forcefully asserts that “[t]he ideology of development was exploited as a means for reproducing political hegemony; it got limited attention and served hardly any purpose as a framework for economic transformation.” His critique of the development paradigm, behaviors, and agendas of the West is similarly scathing; he points to structural adjustment policies as an example of “development against the people – not of them or for them” and states that “[f]oreign development agents do not see the people as agents of development or as the essential energy that must fuel it, as a source of ideas of how to proceed, or even as a constituency to which the agents are accountable. With few exceptions, they do not even take seriously the idea of the people developing themselves.” The policies of the Bretton Woods institutions are cited as examples. While Ake’s book is largely grounded in theory and the interpretation of overall trends, he also offers concrete examples to support his arguments.
Ake (1996) noted how when African leaders have made efforts to assert and carry out policy goals, they found themselves too politically weak and dependent do so. As a result, they were “trapped in the dilemma of choosing between an endogenous agenda that they cannot find the means to implement and an exogenous agenda that they could bring themselves to accept, between what they wanted to do and what they had to do. As a result, African leaders became alienated from development. True development in Africa, Ake contends, will not be able to begin until the struggle over programs and policies is resolved and the character of politics transformed. As long as African leaders are preoccupied with survival, and as long as that survival is inimical to development due to the dynamics and configurations of politics, development cannot occur and violent conflict will persist. Asserting that there is no development in alienation, Ake argues that the only solution to economic as well as political woes lies in meaningful democratization, good governance and cooperation of African leaders. This, Raleigh et al (2009) posit, will not only lay a concrete foundation for development, but also bring an end to the perennial boundary disputes occasioned by quest for mineral resources.
Evbuomwan (2007) posits that since their inception, West African states have been facing corruption as a major problem. In some cases, it has attained levels of gross and egregious theft, for which no possible moral or historical justification can be advanced, and which has played a major role, both in the impoverishment of the region as a whole and specifically in the alienation of its people from their rulers. During the four decades between the 1960s and the 1990s, there have been about 80 violent changes of governments (Adedeji 1999, 3) in the 48 sub-Saharan African countries. During the same period many of these countries also experienced different types of civil strife, conflicts, and wars. At the beginning of the new millennium, there were 18 countries facing armed rebellion, 11 facing severe political crises (Adedeji 1999, 5). Conflicts can be categorised in various ways depending on the type of criteria one uses. For example Salim (1999) classifies conflicts in Africa as follows:
- boundary and territorial conflicts,
- civil wars and internal conflicts having international repercussions,
- succession conflicts in territories decolonised,
- political and ideological conflicts,
- others including those related to transhumance and irredentism.
These arose as a result of the colonial boundaries and although the OAU Charter declared the boundaries inviolable, nevertheless, almost all the interstate conflicts were caused by claims over boundaries. Some important features of African boundaries which were the bases for claims to change them, and claims which led to boundary conflicts, are:
- many boundaries were imprecise;
- some boundaries were straddled by a large ethnic group considered strategic by one side of the boundary;
- some boundaries passed through strategic terrain desired by countries on both sides of the boundary;
- some boundaries passed by areas rich with mineral resources all of which fell on one side of the boundary, thus excluding the other country. Inevitably, one or a combination of any of these factors became the bases of a claim by one country or another to change the boundary or to claim territory which fell on the other side of the colonial boundary. Thus the first boundary war was between Algiers and Morocco immediately after independence (1964/65). The latest and strangest boundary dispute is between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In between there were several short boundary conflicts mainly in West Africa. Altogether there were very few boundary conflicts, given the number of states – 52 for the OAU as a whole, and 48 for sub-Saharan Africa.
The United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA, 2006) observed that the the existence of widespread corruption, especially in societies beset by mass poverty and very high levels of unemployment, has a deeply corrosive effect on trust in government and contributes to crime and political disorder. In the political realm, corruption undermines democracy and good governance by flouting or even subverting formal processes. Corruption in legislative bodies reduces accountability and distorts representation in policymaking; corruption in the judiciary compromises the rule of law; and corruption in public administration results in the unequal distribution of services. Atuobi (2007) notes that more generally, corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and public offices are bought and sold. Similarly, Theobald (1990) points that at the extreme, unbridled corruption can lead to state fragility and destructive conflict, and plunged into “unremitting cycle of institutional anarchy and violence”. In as much as corruption destroys the legitimacy of government in the eyes of those who can do something about the situation, it contributes to instability. In Ghana and other West African states, corruption and embezzlement of public funds have often been cited among the reasons for military takeovers (Ayee, 2002).
USAID (2007) observe that for the past two decades, internal conflicts with spill over effect have severely disrupted West African social and economic development. The states of the Mano River Union – Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone – have been embroiled in civil wars that have had negative impact on their neighbours. Low intensity conflict in the Casamance region of Senegal has intermittently engaged The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal for the past decade, while the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula has been the source of conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria. More often than not, corruption has played a key role in fomenting and prolonging these conflicts by serving as the basis for grievance against political leaders and violent political change. Internal conflicts in West Africa are commonly financed by the illegal sale of arms or the illicit extraction of high value natural resources such as diamonds, gold, and timber. According to Ado (2005) weapons trafficked across the sub-region are eventually used by rebel groups and criminals for fighting civil wars, as in the case of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote D’Ivoire, among others, or used for armed robbery, thus increasing cross boundary tensions in the fragile region of west Africa.. Corruption also represents a threat to peacebuilding in across the states in West Africa.
. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development is about consolidating and accelerating these gains. It is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialised countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations.
The founding documents of NEPAD establish the explicit aim of this African initiative: it is to serve as a tool for the mobilization of political will on the African continent and of technical and financial support from the rest of the world. The initiative cannot replace the responsibility of individual States for the well-being of their people or their development plans, programmes and projects launched with their own and/or external resources.
Thus, over the centuries, Africa became the marginalised continent. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, therefore seeks to build on and celebrate the achievements of the past, as well as reflect on the lessons learned through painful experience, so as to establish a partnership that is both credible and capable of implementation. In doing so, the challenge is for the peoples and governments of Africa to understand that development is a process of empowerment and self-reliance. Accordingly, Africans must not be wards of benevolent guardians; rather they must be the architects of their own sustained upliftment.
According to Maserumule (2011) NEPAD is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. [It] is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing world.
The former President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki – one of the founders of NEPAD who played a central role in its conception and development – explains that NEPAD is based on the conviction that “in order for [African] governments to influence globalization, they would have to go beyond the atomistic nation-state and zero-sum sovereignty and recognize their interdependence” (Gumede 2005: 198). In the Address to the Joint Sitting of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces on 31 October 2001 in South Africa, Mbeki argued that “NEPAD represents a resounding inflection expressing an assenting response by Africans to a vexing question raised in the World Bank Publication of 2000 entitled Can Africa Claim the 21st Century” (Mbeki 2002: 149)
Maserumule (2011) notes that as the literature on the history of development in Africa indicates, NEPAD is not the first initiative developed to address the development challenges on the African continent. A variety of development initiatives, some developed in Africa by Africans others externally by international organisations such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were pursued in the past (Abrahamsen 2000). These early development initiatives2 are important preludes to understanding NEPAD. This is in spite of the fact that some of the early development initiatives, especially those that emerged after the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, made reference to the political dimension of development. The economic reductionism approach is premised on the “econo-mythical” invocation that “if the economics are right, everything else will fall into place” (Cernea 1994: 07).
Compared with Africa’s previous development initiatives, NEPAD does not lose sight of the importance of political and public administration dimensions of development with strong emphasis on good governance. It links these dimensions or variables of development to the economic and socio-economic ones. Mhone (2003: 16) argues that “while NEPAD may not be the first initiatives to posit the need for continental approaches to transformation, it is the first to posit the grand problematique as entailing the need to attain sustainable human development and democratic or good governance as joint objectives”.
To achieve these objectives, African leaders will take joint responsibility for the following:- strengthening mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution at the regional and continental levels, and to ensure that these mechanisms are used to restore and maintain peace; promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and participatory governance at the national and sub-national levels; restoring and maintaining macro-economic stability, especially by developing appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and introducing appropriate institutional frameworks to achieve these standards; instituting transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and auditing of private companies and the public sector; revitalizing and extend the provision of education, technical training and health services, with high priority given to tackling HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases; promoting the role of women in social and economic development by reinforcing their capacity in the domains of education and training; by the development of revenue – generating activities through facilitating access to credit; and by assuring their participation in the political and economic life of African countries; building the capacity of the states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework as well as maintaining law and order; Promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification in the agro-industries and manufacturing to serve both domestic and export markets.
According to USAID (2007), most African countries are small both in terms of population and per capital incomes. As a consequence of limited markets, they do not offer attractive returns to potential investors, while progress in diversifying production and exports is retarded. This limits investment in essential infrastructure that depends on economies of scale for viability. These economic conditions point to the need for African countries to pool their resources and enhance regional development and economic integration on the continent, in order to improve international competitiveness. The five sub-regional economic groupings of the continent must therefore be strengthened. This underlines the import of NEPAD.
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development focuses on the provision of essential regional public goods (such as transport, energy, water, ICT, disease eradication, environmental preservation, and provision of regional research capacity), as well as the promotion of intra-African trade and investments. The focus will be on rationalizing the institutional framework for economic integration, by identifying common projects compatible with integrated country and regional development programmes and on the harmonization of economic and investment policies and practices. There needs to be co-ordination of nationals’ sector policies and effective monitoring of regional decisions.
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development will give priority to capacity building in order to enhance the effectiveness of existing regional structures and the rationalization of existing regional organizations. The African Development Bank must play a leading role in financing regional studies, programmes and projects. This study, therefore, examines the New Partnership for Africa Development and boundary disputes in West Africa between 2001 and 2012.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
From the antiquity to contemporary times, competition and conflict are regarded as inherent phenomena in both nature and society. Latent or violent social confrontations have long been considered as the premium mobile for social changes and transformations. Arguments to support this proposition are that conflicts and competition are inevitable and ubiquitous in all societies at all times. Similarly, in the best of circumstances, conflicts and competition are bounded and circumscribed. Contending groups of people and rival nations get involved in violent conflicts either because their interests or values are challenged or because their needs are not met. The deprivation (actual or potential) of any important value, induces fear, a sense of threat, and unhappiness. Whether contending groups in a particular society are defined by ethnicity, religion, ideology, gender, or class identities, they have, by definition, different needs, interests, values and access to power and resources. Understandably, such differences necessarily generate social conflicts and competition. What is at issue, therefore, is how to manage and resolve inherent social conflicts before they degenerate into violent expressions and massive destruction. The major positive and negative changes and transformations in the world history occurred as a result of resolving old intractable conflicts through violence or war. In fact, the epochal making social revolutions of the past centuries were the only way of resolving irreconcilable conflicts of different social formations.
Greater integration with the world economy through trade and capital flows has afforded some developing countries the avenue to partake in the opportunities and benefits of globalization, to develop their comparative advantages and gain access to newer, more appropriate technology, while financial liberalization has increased their access to international private capital, permitting them to realize much higher rates of economic growth. Africa has remained poor and lags behind other regions in exploiting the benefits of globalization, namely, increasing the resources available for productive investment, and enhancing efficiency of their use and facilitating the transfer of technologies. A number of mutually reinforcing factors account for the wide gap between Africa’s economic integration with the world markets and its potentials, and its stagnation/underdevelopment at large. These relate to the structure of production and export, and the policy and institutional environment. Also, there is the issue of weak initial conditions reflecting lack of domestic economic capacity, and weak social infrastructure following the colonial experience. African countries have been made weaker by low export prices and significant terms of trade decline as well as the heavy burden of external debt servicing. Besides, is the issue of dictatorial regimes and poor governance characterized by abuse of power and economic mismanagement, all of which undermined the development process? The last twenty-five years have witnessed intensification of intrastate conflicts in West Africa. The subregion’s leaders have tried to resolve these conflicts using various traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. These mechanisms have included commissions of mediation, ad-hoc committees, mediation by African Heads of State and the use of the Chieftaincy Institution. Recent conflicts in the region have, however, revealed that the use of these mechanisms alone has not helped much in resolving the conflicts and preventing the outbreak of violence. Since 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has resorted to employing military intervention forces as a major part of its conflict resolution mechanisms. These interventions have created an atmosphere conducive for diplomatic means and the traditional conflict resolution means to be employed to resolve conflicts in the West Africa sub region.
During the bipolar era, the Cold War competition and rivalries between two ideological blocs largely shaped the security environment of Africa states. On the one hand, it internationalized otherwise local conflicts. The superpower competition for global influence exacerbated and prolonged local and regional conflicts in an extensive bipolar rivalry. Each superpower, fearing the other might provide decisive support and thereby gain political advantage, was driven to assist one or the other party. By the same token, the bipolar structure of the Cold War allowed local disputants to manoeuvre superpowers to advance their respective interests (Rugumamu, 1997).
On the other hand, the superpower also restrained local African conflicts out of fear of escalation. In their spheres of influence, each superpower suppressed conflicts, concerned that open disputes would create opportunities for the other to intervene in its politically sensitive backyard. By whatever means, the superpowers did exercise a degree of management to counteract increased regional tensions, keep conflicts within bounds, and occasionally even imposing settlements. They restrained their client regimes by stationing troops, extending security commitments, rejecting or limiting the shipment of advanced offensive weaponry, applying political pressure, and using economic rewards and threats of punishment to elicit certain behaviour. In the process, foreign powers imposed an artificial and tenuous stability on the continent by propping up regimes of client states. Unquestionably, this is one of the major ways in which numerous dictators in the Third World in general, and in Africa in particular, were born, bred, and sustained. The blind support by Cold War worriers of many unpopular and oppressive African regimes, inevitably led to aggrieved groups to carry out coups d’etats, start secessionist and irredentist movements, and rebellions against the state. So powerful were the Cold War dynamics that they set in motion serious internal conflicts that have long outlasted the Cold War itself (Lakes and Morgan, 1997).
Once the Cold War ended, and communism was no longer considered a serious threat to Western global interests, Africa’s intrinsic significance to its former allies eroded irretrievably. This led, in turn, to the relaxing of vast networks of alliances, obligations, and agreements that bound most African states to competing global security systems. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnership, and regional support systems exposed weak African states to systemic instability. The Cold War zealots were no longer as interested in the continent’s regime stability as before. In fact, Africans were increasingly reminded to learn how to fend for themselves. Slowly but inexorably, foreign powers began to withdraw their automatic support from authoritarian African regimes, and the concomitant financial, military and political assistance that accompanied that support. Expectedly, the hollow nature and character of the African state, and the unfinished agenda of nation building became manifestly obvious. Consequently, international boundary disputes began to emerge. Among these disputes is the Ghana-Ivory Coast, Nigeria-Cameroun Bakassi dispute, among others. These development undermined cooperation among these neigbhouring states. This study therefore aims to address the following questions:
- Has the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) led to reduction in boundary disputes in West Africa.?
- Has NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) enhanced good governance in Africa, particularly in Nigeria?
1.3 Objectives of Study
The major objective of the study is to investigate the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and boundary disputes in West Africa with focus on the Nigeria-Cameroun Bakassi dispute. However, the specific objectives include:
- To determine if the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) has led to reduction in boundary disputes in West Africa.; and
- To establish if NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has enhance good governance in Africa, particularly Nigeria.
1.4 Significance of the Study
The study has theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, it examined the role of New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and boundary disputes in West Africa. This is necessary considering the resources African nations invest in prosecuting disputes which would otherwise have been invested to improve the lot of the citizens of African countries. The study therefore is a contribution to show how boundary disputes in Africa contributed to underdevelopment in the continent, particularly in the western axis, as well as the instrumentality of NEPAD and its APRM in mitigating boundary disputes and poor governance.
Practically, it is expected that the study will be of immense benefit to political leaders, diplomats, students of international relations and all who have interest in the development of the African country as the study highlighted the benefits and mechanisms of good governance contained in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
1.5 Scope of the Study
The focus of the study is Boundary Dispute and Implementation of NEPAD in West Africa since 2001. Therefore, the study has as its scope, boundary disputes that involve West Africa States. It includes disputes involving one or more nation state in the West African sub region. Consequently, the study is limited to development in boundary disputes in the region since the beginning of the implementation of the New Partnership for African Development, NEPAD, in 2001.
1.6 Operational Definitions
NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa Development. It is a call for a new relationship of partnership between leaders/nations Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialised countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations
Boundary: it is a line dividing land territory over which states exercise full territorial sovereignty
Governance: is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources.
Good Governance: is also effective, equitable, participatory, transparent and accountable governance
Frontier: is as a boundary region, zone or tract which forms a belt of separation, contact or transition between political units.
Partnership: involves institutionalized mechanisms and processes for working in partnerships of public, private and civic actors in conducting the business of governance at all levels
Dispute: is an official augment or disagreement between two or more parties, especially between nation-states
Development: is the process of improving the socio-economic and political welfare of a people.